We consider an exchange economy with time-inconsistent consumers whose preferences are additively separable. If consumers have identical discount factors, then allocations that are Pareto efficient at the initial date are also renegotiationproof. In an economy with a sequence of markets, competitive equilibria are Pareto efficient in this sense, and for generic endowments, only if preferences are locally homothetic.
Introduction
There has been a recent upsurge of interest in models in which consumers have presentbiased time-inconsistent preferences. This interest is motivated in part by introspection, by experiments, and by the possibility that certain types of behavior can be more easily understood using such preferences.
1
Much of the literature has relied on additively separable preferences with identical subjective discount factors and homothetic utility functions.
2
As is the case when preferences are time consistent, this means that the distribution of wealth does not affect equilibrium prices when markets are complete. This paper points out that there is an additional implication that is not expected, not robust, and therefore potentially misleading. The implication is that the competitive equilibrium of an exchange economy with a sequence of markets is Pareto efficient from the perspective of consumers making decisions at any given point in time.
This efficiency result is unexpected because the classic proof of the First Welfare Theorem fails. In an economy with a sequence of markets, consumer choices are taken to be the outcome of an intrapersonal game. A decision maker at a point in time is not in full control of the consumption sequence selected in equilibrium from the budget set, and so a Pareto improvement may well be budget feasible at equilibrium prices, for every consumer in the economy. It is easy to construct explicit examples in which the efficiency result fails when consumers discount future utilities differently. 3 We show that, even when consumers discount future utilities in the same way, homotheticity is also in essence necessary for the efficiency result. When preferences are not locally homothetic, competitive equilibria are inefficient for generic endowments.
The underlying reason for the special role of homotheticity stems from the fact that time-inconsistency distorts intertemporal marginal rates of substitution by a factor that depends on marginal propensities to consume out of next-period wealth. The linear consumption function implied by identical homothetic preferences ensures that this distortion is the same across consumers. This guarantees efficiency. But when consumers do not have the same homothetic preferences, marginal propensities to consume out of next-period wealth typically differ across consumers. In turn this causes marginal rates of consumption between current and next-period consumption to differ across consumers. The resulting allocation of resources will be inefficient.
Efficiency in an exchange economy

The economy
We consider a three-period exchange economy with a finite number I of consumer types.
There is a continuum of consumers of each type, and for notational simplicity we take each of these continua to be of unit measure. A single good is available for consumption in every period. A consumer of type i has positive endowments e i t of this good in period t, and aggregate endowments in this period are denoted by e t . A consumer of type i has preferences over non-negative consumption sequences c 
in period 1, and by:
in period 2. The subjective discount factors δ 1 and δ 2 are positive, and the period utility functions u i : R + → R ∪ {−∞} are assumed to be strictly increasing, continuous, and strictly concave. These preferences are time-inconsistent whenever δ 2 1 = δ 2 , with a bias toward the present if δ 2 1 < δ 2 . Note that, although the period utility functions u i may vary across consumer types, we take the discount factors δ 1 and δ 2 to be the same for all consumer types.
Efficient allocations
A symmetric allocation in this economy is a vector c ∈ R 3I + of consumption sequences, one for each consumer type. 
) for all i, with a strict inequality for at least one i.
Date-1 efficiency is the natural notion of efficiency when consumers can commit ex ante to a sequence of consumption choices. When this is not the case, renegotiationproof allocations correspond to a notion of constrained efficiency: these allocations are efficient when evaluated using date-1 preferences, subject to the constraint that the implied date-2 allocations are efficient when evaluated using date-2 preferences. It turns out that this constraint does not bind when all consumers discount future utilities in the same way.
Proposition 1. When consumers have identical discount factors, the sets of date-1
Pareto efficient and of renegotiation-proof allocations coincide.
Proof. Let e = (e 1 , e 2 , e 3 ), and consider the set U 1 ,
Because the aggregate resource constraint is convex and the utility functions U 
Since the resource constraints are independent across time and preferences are additively separable, and since the discount factors δ 1 and δ 2 are the same across consumers, the solution to (1) can be obtained by solving:
for all t. This in turn implies that c solves:
Therefore, since λ ≥ 0 and λ = 0, there exists no feasible allocationc such that U 
, with T possibly infinite. Proposition 1 also holds under uncertainty if preferences after every history can be represented by an expected utility function using subjective probabilities that are updated using Bayes' rule. 
For c(λ) to remain Pareto efficient at date 2, it must be that (c 2 (λ), c 3 (λ)) solves:
for some vector of Pareto weights µ. Using (2)- (3) together with the fact that there is a one-to-one relationship between efficient allocations and Pareto weights, it is not difficult to check that the only circumstance in which this will be the case is when the ratio
is constant across consumers. This is automatically satisfied if consumers have 5 An axiomatic foundation of such preferences can proceed mostly along the usual lines. To allow for time-inconsistency and still obtain subjective probabilities that satisfy Bayes' rule, one has to assume that preferences are consistent across information sets. 
Competitive equilibria in economies with a sequence of markets
The Second Welfare Theorem implies that date-1 efficient allocations can be implemented using competitive markets in which trade in one-and two-period bonds takes place only at date 1. When preferences are time-consistent, one can use this to construct an equivalent equilibrium for an economy with a sequence of markets in which consumers can trade in one-period bonds (Arrow [1] ). A consumption plan that is feasible in one economy is feasible in the other, and time-consistency ensures that consumers who make plans at one date will not want to revise them at a later date.
This last observation is no longer true when preferences are time-inconsistent, and we therefore need to study economies with a sequence of markets separately.
Markets
We consider the following market structure. Consumers trade in markets for one-period discount bonds at dates 1 and 2. They face no constraints on borrowing, other than that they must be able to pay off their debts at date 3. The sequence of bond markets allows consumers to exchange consumption at any one date for consumption at any other date. The price of date-t consumption in terms of some numeraire is denoted by p t and thus the price in terms of date-t consumption of a bond that pays one unit of consumption at date t + 1 is simply p t+1 /p t . We let p = (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ) and normalize p so that it belongs to the unit simplex ∆ 3 of R 3 ++ . Following Pollak [14] and Peleg and Yaari [12] , we view each individual consumer as composed of a sequence of autonomous decision makers, indexed by time. We refer to the decision maker at date t as the "date-t consumer." Taking prices as given, a trading strategy for the date-t consumer is a decision how much to consume and save given any history at date t. For any given individual consumer, we require these trading strategies to form a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the intrapersonal game played between the corresponding date-1, -2 and -3 consumers.
The date-2 exchange economy
At date 3, a typical consumer simply consumes his or her wealth, which consists of endowments and maturing bonds. At date 2, the same consumer chooses how much to consume and how many bonds to buy. Given wealth w 2 ≥ 0 and prices p ∈ ∆ 3 , a date-2 consumer of type i solves:
Let c i 2 (p, w 2 ) and c i 3 (p, w 2 ) be the decision rules that solve (4) for various prices p and wealth levels w 2 . The utility perceived by the date-1 consumer from these choices is captured by a value function V i defined by:
For given prices p, there is no guarantee that this value function will be concave in date-2 wealth w 2 if preferences are not time-consistent. 6 This may give a date-1 consumer an incentive to trade in lotteries (Luttmer and Mariotti [10] ). In the absence of lottery markets, the non-concavity of V i (p, ·) can cause the set of optimal consumption and savings choices of a date-1 consumer to be non-convex.
Competitive equilibrium
By trading in one-period bonds, a date-1 consumer of type i with wealth w 1 can choose levels of date-1 consumption and date-2 wealth that solve:
The set of solutions to this decision problem is denoted by [c 
6 Morris [11] shows that in the case of present bias (δ 2 > δ 
We can now prove the following result. 
Smooth preferences
Under what circumstances will the competitive equilibria shown to exist in Proposition 
Efficient allocations
Suppose Assumption S holds. Given a vector of aggregate endowments e, the set of interior date-1 Pareto efficient allocations is then given by those c ∈ R
3I
++ that for some λ ∈ R I ++ and p ∈ R 3 ++ satisfy the marginal conditions:
and feasibility conditions:
for all i and t. We can take λ to be in the unit simplex ∆ I of R I ++ . Let P be the set of pairs (e, c) of aggregate endowments and consumption allocations that satisfy (7)- (8) . In the Appendix we show that P is a (I + 2)-dimensional manifold. Thus, given aggregate endowments, the manifold of Pareto efficient allocations is, as expected, of dimension I − 1.
Equilibrium allocations
Fix some price vector p ∈ ∆ 3 . Under Assumption S, the decisions of a date-2 consumer of type i with positive wealth w 2 are fully characterized by the date-2 budget constraint and the usual first-order condition:
Moreover, for a fixed p, the decision rules c 
where the function f i is defined by:
Note that in the case of time-consistent preferences, this expression reduces to δ 1 , as expected from (10) and the envelope condition for (4). The consumption and wealth choices of a date-1 consumer of type i with positive wealth w 1 must satisfy the date-1 budget constraint and the usual first-order condition:
Any feasible consumption allocation that satisfies (9)- (11) for all consumers i and some prices p is a candidate for a symmetric competitive equilibrium allocation. Alternatively, given aggregate endowments e, a feasible allocation c that is part of a competitive equilibrium must for some λ ∈ ∆ I and p ∈ R 3 ++ satisfy:
for all i. Because the first-order conditions (11) need not be sufficient, some of the feasible allocations admitted by (12) may not correspond to an equilibrium. The collection of (e, c) such that c is a symmetric competitive equilibrium allocation given aggregate endowments e is contained in a manifold of dimension I + 2.
Efficient equilibria are non-generic
A comparison of (7) and ( 
Relative to the definition of P, this adds I additional restrictions and the new variable ξ. Since P is an (I + 2)-dimensional manifold, this suggests that the set of aggregate endowments and efficient equilibrium allocations is 3-dimensional. For given aggregate endowments, this would imply that there are only isolated points at which the equilibrium and efficient allocations coincide.
Whether or not this is indeed the case depends on whether the equations (13) are locally independent of the efficiency conditions (7)- (8) . The following three examples show why this need not be true. Our main result shows that these examples of efficiency are special, either because of homotheticity, or because of non-generic endowments. Specifically, if preferences are nowhere locally homothetic, then condition (13) will, for generic endowments, be independent of the efficiency conditions (7)- (8), and a symmetric competitive equilibrium will not be date-1 Pareto efficient.
We will say that preferences are locally homothetic if the ratio:
is constant over some range. That is, preferences exhibit locally linear risk tolerance
Our next assumption precisely rules out this case. This gives rise to the following result.
7 A weaker version of Assumption Z would require that the set of points at which Ds i vanishes is nowhere dense in R ++ . The results derived below hold under this alternative assumption provided "measure zero" is replaced by "nowhere dense and closed" in all the statements below.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions S and Z, the set of date-1 Pareto efficient allocations and the set of equilibrium allocations intersect only at isolated points, except
for economies with aggregate endowments in a closed set of measure zero.
Because the set of date-1 Pareto efficient allocations and the set of renegotiationproof allocations coincide when consumers have identical discount factors, Proposition 3 can be interpreted as a constrained inefficiency result. The importance of homotheticity is easy to understand. Specifically, (11) can be expressed using the marginal propensity to consume out of date-2 wealth as:
This is the generalized Euler equation of Harris and Laibson [5] . It follows from (14) that date-1 efficiency requires all consumers to have the same marginal propensity to consume out of date-2 wealth in equilibrium. Proposition 3 shows that this can hold generically only for the linear consumption functions implied by identical homothetic preferences. In analogy with the incomplete markets literature (Stiglitz [15] , Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [4] ), the intuition is that competitive date-1 consumers do not internalize the impact of their savings decisions on date-2 and -3 prices, which in turn affect the decisions of date-2 consumers and therefore the welfare of date-1 consumers.
Identical homothetic preferences ensure that equilibrium prices do not depend on the distribution of wealth across consumers, and this is what leads to a (constrained) efficient allocation in equilibrium.
Concluding remarks
Renegotiation-proofness is a benchmark for efficiency in an economy in which it is not possible to commit not to renegotiate. One would expect renegotiation-proof allocations to arise in an environment in which a contract is enforced unless all parties to the contract agree to re-write it, and in which bargaining is efficient. Our results show that a sequence of competitive markets need not achieve this benchmark of efficiency. An interesting open question is whether there are decentralized mechanisms, other than a complete set of date-1 markets, that do.
We have focussed on exchange economies. The example of Krusell, Kuruşçu,
and Smith [7] shows that the competitive equilibrium in a production economy with identical consumers and homothetic preferences can yield a higher level of utility to consumers at the initial date than does any renegotiation-proof allocation. Thus renegotiation-proof allocations need no longer be Pareto efficient from the perspective of consumers at the initial date. Instead, competitive markets generate a form of commitment that makes these consumers better off than when they have access to efficient centralized bargaining procedures. However, the use of homothetic preferences in Krusell, Kuruşçu, and Smith [7] rules out the sort of inefficiency of competitive markets that can occur even in an exchange economy.
A Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1. As defined in (7)- (8), P is parameterized by pairs (e, λ) of aggregate endowments and Pareto weights. It will be more convenient to parameterize P instead using the vector of aggregate endowments e, together with a feasible allocation c t at one particular date t. To construct such a parameterization, consider any (e t , λ) in R ++ × ∆ I and solve the date-t version of (7)- (8) for (e t , c t ). This defines a function g that maps R ++ ×∆ I onto the set F of strictly positive (e t , c t ) that satisfy the feasibility constraint (8) . The inverse of this function is given by (e t , l(c t )), where:
for each i. One can show that g is a diffeomorphism (see Luttmer and Mariotti [10] ).
Fix any t, take a vector (e, c t ) such that (e t , c t ) ∈ F , and define:
(e s , c s ) = g(e s , l(c t )) for s = 1, 2, 3. This defines a map ϕ t that takes any point (e t , c t , e −t ) from Θ = F ×R 2 ++ and maps it into P. The fact that g is a diffeomorphism implies that ϕ t : Θ → P is a diffeomorphism as well. Clearly, Θ is a (I + 2)-dimensional manifold, and so P must be too. Given aggregate endowments, the manifold of Pareto efficient allocations is, as expected, of dimension I − 1.
Step 2. Define, for every t:
For every t, we have ϕ −1 t (B t ) ⊂ A t . Assumption Z implies that A t has measure zero in Θ. Since ϕ t is a diffeomorphism, it then follows that B t has measure zero in P, for every t. Thus, leaving out points from the efficient manifold at which some Ds is not equal to zero, and let Step 4. We are now ready to complete the proof of Proposition 3. A convenient way to describe the set of efficient equilibrium allocations defined by (7)- (8) and (12) (15)- (16) . The Transversality Theorem implies that for generic endowments e, efficient equilibrium allocations c are isolated. This proves Proposition 3.
